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11 December 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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Congo: The military situation in Elisabethville apparently remains stalemated. According to press reports, Katangan forces have attacked UN positions on the outskirts of the city, so far without success. The UN retains its air superiority, and it has received armored cars from elsewhere in the Congo; however, it remains unable or unwilling to take the offensive on the ground. UN headquarters in Leopoldville-which seems to be receiving only sporadic information from its commanders in Katanga-is attempting to move further reinforcements to Elisabethville and also to Manono, where the UN garrison is under increasing pressure from a 750-man Katangan force.

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The UN's inability so far to break Katangan resistance seems to have consolidated the position of Katangan extremists such as Interior Minister Munongo, who reportedly assumed complete control of the government during Tshombé's recent absence. The Katangan forces are said to consider the continuing military standoff as a sign of victory for them, and they might not obey a cease-fire order even if Tshombé should issue one. Anti-American feeling is spreading among the Katangans. Violent demonstrations against the American Consulate in Elisabethville, which apparently were organized by the youth wing of Tshombé's Conakat party, took place on 10 December. Except for official US representatives, most of the Americans in Katanga now have been evacuated. []

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India-Portugal: Tension over the Goa problem appears to have eased slightly. Isolated shooting incidents continue to be reported by both sides, however, and extremist elements in the divided Goan nationalist movement in India, encouraged by the Indian military buildup in the border area, are continuing attempts to set off disturbances within the Portuguese territories

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widespread enough to force Indian action.

New Delhi has not yet reacted to Lisbon's proposal of 8 December that "independent international observers" be sent to the scene for an impartial investigation; Indian officials are unlikely to accept any internationalization of the dispute which would reinforce Portugal's juridical position.

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USSR-Berlin: Khrushchev's threatening tone in his 9 December speech and the signs of further Communist moves on the Berlin situation seem intended to exert pressure on the West during the current consultations in Paris. A Soviet protest on US troop movements on the Berlin autobahn seems likely in view of the Soviet commandant's request for a meeting with General Watson on 11 December. The Soviet and East German press have given increased emphasis to charges that rotation of US troops in Berlin constitutes an "aggressive act"; they assert that these troops are under NATO command and are therefore not guaranteed free passage under the Soviet - East German agreement of September 1955. The East German Foreign Ministry has also scheduled a press conference for 12 December, which will probably deal with US actions as well as the East German announcement of 8 December confirming that "as customary" all vehicles with civilian personnel entering East Berlin must show "identification."

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*USSR-Albania-China: The USSR's rupture of diplomatic and economic relations with Albania constitutes Moscow's most serious challenge to date to the Chinese Communists, who, if they continue to support Albania as they have in the past, must now endorse a regime which is clearly and formally outside the bloc. The extension of the dispute from the gray area of party relations to the concrete sphere of governmental relations will serve as a sharp warning to the Chinese and other Communists that Khrushchev is willing to use extreme measures in order to reassert Soviet leadership of the bloc. Moscow's action--which will probably be imitated by the East European satellites--also forces an unwelcome choice on the leaders of North Korea and North Vietnam, who had been trying to occupy a middle ground between Moscow and Peiping.

The Soviet move makes the dispute between Moscow and its supporters on one side and Albania and the Chinese on the other almost impossible to reconcile and therefore appears to rule out agreement by Soviet leaders to any bloc meeting to consider the points at issue between the Soviet and Albanian parties. Khrushchev is making it clear that he considers the issue one of power and national interest and that he looks upon the struggle as one not to be compromised but to be unremittingly pursued. While the Soviet notes as published in the Albanian press clearly foreshadow formal action to suspend Tirana's membership in the Warsaw Pact, there is no hint that Moscow is developing a pretext for direct military intervention.

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
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Venezuela-Colombia: The Venezuelan Communist party is apparently intent on trying to disrupt President Kennedy's visit of 16 and 17 December, but the government's extensive security precautions are likely to limit the party's ability to interfere. Relying on a small paramilitary unit of about 200 in Caracas and on student sympathizers, the Communists have recently injected a strong anti-Kennedy note in the sporadic anti-government disturbances they have been carrying on since the break in diplomatic relations between Venezuela and Cuba in early November. The rioting has led to several police casualties, most recently on 8 December, but the disruptive Communist-leftist potential has been weakened by the government's moves in late November, when a large number of extremists were arrested, sizable quantities of weapons were seized, and the headquarters of the Communist party and its political ally, the Leftist Revolutionary Movement, were closed.

Pro-Castro groups in Colombia may seize on Colombia's break in diplomatic relations with Cuba on 9 December as a pretext for disruptive action. Prior to the break, Colombian

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[redacted] extremists had been reported planning to limit their anti-Kennedy activity to propaganda. The break was provoked by Castro's 8 December public attack on Colombia. [redacted]

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[redacted]

Trinidad: Premier Eric Williams of Trinidad, in his first public appearance since his party's landslide electoral victory on 4 December, described the 10-month-old agreement between the US, UK, and West Indies regarding the Chaguaramas naval base and other facilities as "dead." He almost certainly will demand negotiation of a new agreement, in the hope of extracting more aid, rather than elimination of the US base.

[redacted]

Williams also repudiated the West Indies Federation. Since Jamaica had already rejected federation in a referendum, Williams' long-awaited stand probably completes its destruction and will leave Britain with its other eastern Caribbean dependencies as economic liabilities indefinitely.

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[redacted] (Backup, Page 1)

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
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Trinidad's Premier Denounces West Indies Federation



[[In a public speech on 6 December Williams denounced the West Indies Federation as "one of the most disgraceful episodes in the history of the West Indies." Williams claimed that the people of Trinidad had themselves rejected federation in the 4 December elections when they elected only 9 members of the pro-Federation opposition party to 20 of Williams' party, which had been noncommittal on this issue.]]

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[[Williams sufficiently dominates his party and government to bring about Trinidad's withdrawal. Through the petroleum industry and other industrial and agricultural activities Trinidad could support itself with little outside aid, and London will concede independence if Williams insists.]]

[[Despite the seeming finality of Williams' remarks, London may not yet abandon all hope that the premier may be induced by increased aid offers to change his mind. The British do not want to be left with a continuing burden of financing the unviable smaller eastern Caribbean islands.]]

[[Under the Defense Areas Agreement, legally valid for 17 years, which Williams signed in February 1961 in his capacity as Trinidad's premier, the United States this year is providing Trinidad with \$17,300,000 in grants and loans. In addition to the naval base, under the agreement the United States retains a radar research facility on Trinidad. Collapse of the Federation and loss of Jamaica's and Trinidad's economic support are also likely to develop pressure for more aid from the US in St. Lucia and Antigua, where other important missile-tracking and space-research facilities are located.]]

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